Next week Gallagher will present arguments on what's known as the "motor theory of language" - meaning, language evolved from gestures first, not vocalizations - a hotly debated topic, as you can imagine!
Our presenters will be:
Jeremy: Gallagher 05
Yuna: Arbib 05 from page 1 to page 27 (up to Fabrega's comment)
Keith: Arbib 05 from page 27 on (starting with Fabrega's comment)
Just in case you haven't hear it yet, check out this amazing footage of an Korean Elephant imitating human speech!!
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
This is another case of an aquatic animal imitating human speech (I assume you all got the beluga video from last week!) -
I love it!
Since we only have 3 talks left in our series, I started adding up your presentations that you did so far in order to distribute the rest of the paper presentations in such a way that everybody ends up with a fair share!
I assigned the rest of the papers in the following way:
Blatti 14th November:
Presenters:
Abby: Penn et al. Part one (30 pages)
Kenneth: Penn et el. part two (30 pages)
Stefano: De Garcia -Selfawareness
Ferkin 21st of November:
Presenter:
ChiaCheng: MF Folia Zool 2011 and MF Nature 04
Stefano: MF J Ethology 2007
These BBS papers that we talked about last time will show you how little agreement there is in the scientific community on these topics - which is a reflection, of course, of how little we know about these things yet - lots of room to speculate in every direction!
Have fun!
Uli
“Growth points from the very beginning” is a very interesting article. I have a few questions that relate to it. First, I would like to know what is the influence of culture on joint gesture-speech. How universal is this phenomenon? Is the analysis of twenty cultures enough to say that this is a universal phenomenon that characterizes every human being? Second, speech and gesture are said to be “co-espressive but non-redundant”. It is not clear to me that they are non-redundant: if I can say something without gesticulating, why is gesture non-redundant? Sometimes gestures have other functions than communicating meaning. For example, sometimes people make gestures to underline a point (e.g. I knock the table in a certain way when I want to stress that something is important), but the gestures are not related to the meaning that is transmitted in that particular moment. Third, the idea that grammar has evolved in order to stabilize the instability created by simultaneous unlike modes (see p. 121) sounds interesting. How successful is this hypothesis in the literature? But are we sure that grammar would have been the best way to stabilize the ambiguity of the system? Why not other gesture to disambiguate preceding gestures? Fourth, the authors say, “it is not correct to claim that IW gestures normally as a result of having already developed the ‘skill’ by age 19, the time of his illness”. However, it seems to me that if IW had not acquired the habit to gesticulate when he was young, he would not “blindly” gesticulate now. Plus, does he not gesticulate in the particular way people in his culture do? To what extent can we attribute his behavior to an innate neural mechanism? Fifth, I’m not sure I have understood how Mead’s loop and mirror neurons integrate with each other. The idea seems to be this: when I make a gesture the activation of my mirror neuron M’ projects provokes a response in a certain area R’; at the same time the person who perceives my gesture activates her own mirror neuron M’’ that provokes a response R’’ parallel to R’. However, this model would not be sharp enough to render all the elements of Mead definition. Indeed, Mead’s definition insists on the idea that the response of the sender is implicit, whereas the response of the receiver is explicit.
ReplyDeleteArbib’s article is really noteworthy because it proposes an analysis of different stages of the development of language. On page 106 Arbib says that the mirror neurons systems allows monkey to “understand praxic actions” and I tend to interpret mirror neurons in a similar way. Lastly, I would like to raise a problem that relates to the idea of newborn imitation having an expressive function (that emerges in Gallagher 2005). It seems a bit implausible that children have evolved this imitative response to interact with parents, because it’s difficult to imagine that our ancestors spent their time making to their toddlers the gestures that Meltzoff displayed to newborns in his experiments.
Fabrega’s comments on Arbib (2005) bring about some interesting questions. Fabrega does a good job to point out gaps in Arbib’s theory of Language Readiness, particularly the transition from grasping MNS into pantomiming and then into conventionalized gestures, which as Fabrega explains, constitutes protosign. I see that the MNS for grasping as a prerequisite to pantomiming is a fairly straightforward concept and appears to follow a logical order. If one agent is able to imitate another agent’s actions, then more is at work than simply the MNS of grasping. Arbib says, “Hence, further evolution of the brain was required for the mirror system for grasping to become an imitation system for grasping”. A very important distinction is being made here: 1) from the brain’s capacity to activate a similar neural system upon observation of an action exhibited by an agent of the same species of the observer and 2) the ability to use or “take advantage” of this mirror neuron phenomenon to guide the action of the observer. Several questions come to mind here. First, Can cross-species observations also trigger the MNS? If we are under the assumption that the MNS for grasping is in place, can we not also assume that other MNS’s are also in place? Arbib does define his S2 as the “Modeling Development of the Mirror System” which supports the conclusion that “mirror neurons can be recruited to recognize and encode an expanding set of novel actions”. So, within S2 agents have the capacity to strengthen neural connections related to the observed action, but do not contain the capacity to actually use those MNS’s to create an action (imitation, as defined by Arbib’s S3). This is a strange assumption for two reasons, 1) it presupposes a limitation of MNS’s that is not explained clearly, and 2) this assumes there is no accidental imitation that occurs as a result of the MNS. “Accidental imitation” here is referring to an unconscious imitation.
ReplyDeleteFurther, I may have missed this, but I did not see what the motivator was to get from (my assumed) accidental imitation to purposeful imitation. I wonder if the vehicle for getting the grasping MNS to an imitation system is emotion. If one agent begins to associate a certain observed action or behavior of another agent to an emotion state, this could be the motivation required to imitate. Consider this scenario: Agent A is an alpha male who has earned himself privileged access to a multitude of female agents. Agent B is a young male who has observed Agent A’s behavior that allowed Agent A the privileged access to multiple females. Among these observed behaviors is the expression of anger. The expression of anger is likely a very important evolutionary advantage because it allows Agent A to intimidate others and inevitably avoid violent confrontation. Agent B now has motivation to imitate Agent A’s expression of anger. The selection pressure here is the ability to imitate emotion states via gestures. Once that capacity becomes inborn, conventionalized gestures is surely within reach of the species.
DeleteApparently the MNS of chimpanzees activates when other chimps AND humans reach for an object. I wonder where this cross-species MNS activation ends. Are we assuming that throughout the history of our evolution that we only learned from animals within our species?
DeleteThe Gallagher paper was quite interesting in that it contained theoretical assumptions from a wide range of viewpoints. Firstly, there was one statement that I completely agreed with: the author states that “gesture is something like a motor supplement to linguistic practice; not an intrinsic part of language, but something added to speech to help it along.” I totally agree that gesture serves as a mechanism that aids speech and helps to place further emphasis on speech. For instance, if a person faces the palm of their hand toward a person and simultaneously says “Stop,” then the gesture seems to provide added meaning and emphasis on the speech. I also believe that gesturing is a form of non-verbal communication in which bodily actions communicate particular messages, which can be used in place of speech or used together with speech. However are there some instances where gesticulations are not used to convey a particular message? For example, a highly anxious person may use gesticulations that may not necessarily have meaning.
ReplyDeleteOne issue of concern, is that in the Gallagher paper, it states that the “According to the communicative theory of gesture, gesture is essentially language and functions primarily in communicative contexts. It is not a motor supplement to language, or something added on to speech to enhance meaning.” This viewpoint is almost the exact opposite of the above statement. For one, how can one define gesture as language? When I think of language, I think of speech or written symbols. Perhaps, language encompasses something beyond my basic definition of language. According to David McNeil, gestures are movements that occur only during speech. However, I am unsure if this is entirely accurate. There are many types of gestures that do not occur during speech such as a simply “wave” gesture
The Gallagher paper "How the Body Shapes the Mind" was an interesting study of motor vs. linguistic systems in reference to gestures. Gallagher et al did a study with a man named Ian whose brain damage would have led to the conclusion that natural body gestures would no longer be possible for him, based on the motor theory. However, Gallagher et all show that Ian, despite his brain damage, continues to integrate body gestures into his linguistic endeavors completely normally. This suggests that these types of gestures are not so much a part of the motor system as the linguistic/communicative system. Their "communicative theory of gesture" suggests that rather than gesture and language being two separate things (gesture supplemental to language), that the two actually are part of one system. In other words, it gesture helps to create the narrative space right along with language.
ReplyDeleteGallagher et al also discuss that gesture is used even when there is no reference to body image or to how the gesturing is being taken by a listener. Blind people who would seemingly have nothing to gain from gesturing, still gesture. Gallagher et all say that this could be because gesturing helps with accomplishing thought just as it accomplishes communication.
Then going back to an evolutionary look at things, Arbib explains at great length how the mirror system, which is suggested to account for both execution and observation of manual actions, could explain how primate communication has evolved over time. These explanations go "beyond the mirror" to explain how our brains have come to be language-ready.
The Arbib article was so long and detailed and involved it was somewhat difficult to read. I'm still not sure exactly how much it agrees with the Gallagher et al integrative theory, simply because a lot of the terminology used is different in Arbib. But this approach to gesturing as an extension of communication that is not only complementary to spoken language, but also helps to create the narrative on an almost unconscious level made sense to me. Until someone points out that I'm gesturing, I almost don't realize I am. However, I have noticed that some people are more flamboyant in their gestures than other. Some hardly gesture at all when they talk, while others are constantly wave their hands around in the air and pointing or molding non-existent objects into being. It makes me wonder what the explanation for that could be, especially in light of the integrative theory. Why are some MORE prone to gesturing than others? Is there some neurolinguistic explanation for it or is it hereditary or learned or what?
I have studied infants’ vocal imitation for some time, and have not found convincing evidence supporting the universality of such behavior. The neonate imitation may suggest possible intersubjectivity; however, it is not a persuasive one. Intersubjectivity, in Piaget’s original definition, is a form of conscious interaction involves at least one sender and a receiver. I am not sure if a newborn being (under four weeks old) can serve both roles well with consciousness. Not surprisingly, the authors recognized this part of concern and said, “Whether neonate imitation is an instance of a priming effect or something closer to intentional action, it brings the infant into a direct relation with another person and starts them on a course of social interaction. At the earliest stages, the adult’s responses to the infant may be what brings the infant into this interaction. By 4–6 weeks, however, imitation is definitely a two-way social interaction in which the child is actively engaged (Rochat 2002)— imitation is a social-communicative (and fully embodied) expression for the infant.” I am still holding a more conservative view on this very last statement.
ReplyDeleteOn the other hand, I appreciate authors’ interpretation about gesture, language and cognition, “The relation between embodiment and language, however, is a self-reciprocating, self-organizing one only if there is another person. The body generates a gestural expression.” I wonder how this interpretation relates to multimodal communication across species. When one speaks and gestures simultaneously, is it more efficient and more unambiguous than speaking or gesturing alone? How about deceptive behavior vs. honest signal in animal kingdom? Are they primarily multimodal or not?
Last question is about the parity of gesticulation and articulation. If gesticulation is only confined to voluntary/communicative/expressive functions and is closely related to articulation, what is the smallest unit of gesticulation? How gesticulation forms embedded sentences or uses recursive structures?
I always seem to come back to music on these types of articles. As an instrumental performer, performing is both a very natural and yet a very strange sensation. When I first began playing classical guitar, my teacher played a little musical figure and then told me to put my fingers in XYZ position and then told me to imitate it. This was strange because my fingers just seemed to do it automatically. I liken it to having a sort of out of body experience. Of course this initial success was very deceiving and it was replaced with the process of spending countless hours of painstakingly trying to trick and program my fingers to assimilate long complex strings of physical motions until they became instinctual. At the same time, in a performance these physical motions are on a sort of autopilot to the point that one must work very hard to maintain balance between your consciousness of the notes you are playing and the motor-memory. For example, if you are playing a difficult piece, if you start daydreaming about something else and then you suddenly start to think about what you are doing, that is when you make a mistake.
ReplyDeleteI kept thinking of this throughout Gallagher's discussion of an Integrative Theory. In these articles, Gallagher talks about a purely motor control based on instrumental motion versus communicative; and within the communicative realm, language versus gestural; and lastly, conscious versus unconscious movements. While the example of Ian Waterman seemed at first almost unfathomable, it made me think of similar instances and delineations between the types of motor control movements and their origins. Similarly, it reminded me of how some savants may be unable button their shirt, but can perform complex pieces of music. In terms of Gallagher’s Integrative Theory of Gesture, would Derek be using the keyboard and sound to use as a target? At the same time, Derek is unable to complete the motor tasks such as putting on his pants or shirt by himself.
http://youtu.be/Ak2jxmhCH1M
I suppose my only question would be, would the only way to discover the process involved the various types motor movements and gestures be through neuroimaging?
The evolution of gestures and vocalizations is still confusing to me, but that is probably why this is a debate in the Arbib paper. Do they have equal status in the process of language evolution? That is, as long as the goal of communication is achieved, it does not matter whether the speaker use gestures or vocalizations. Or gestures support vocalizations? For example, since I came to the US, I have been using gestures a lot to describe things due to my limited English vocabularies. So when I speak English, gestures support my expressive language. If I speak Mandarin, I would use more elaborate phrases and fewer or different kind of gestures. Gestures may not be so important in this case from listeners’ point of view. So the inferred question is that did people in the ancient times, the time that languages have not been well-developed yet, still use more vocalizations than gestures or vice versa? If they used more gestures, then can we say gestures come first? However, I still think vocalizations are important, so I keep confusing myself…
ReplyDeleteAs re-read my comments above, I found I made a mistake---the number of gestures I made also depends on the listeners I am with. If I speak English to an English native speaker, I may have to use a lot of gestures to describe something. However, if I describe something in Mandarin to a non-native speaker of Mandarin, I also have to use a lot of gestures. Thus, this is perhaps not a good example in inferring whether gestures or vocalizations come first.
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